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A SKIRMISH IN THE BATTLE FOR THE
SOUL OF MASSACHUSETTS STATE
GOVERNMENT: PRIVATIZATION OF
GOVERNMENT SERVICES AND THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
APPROPRIATION RESTRICTION
MEASURES
"My criticisms of state government are not directed at the men and
women who serve in its ranks . . . the problem is a system which
dissipates their talents and frustrates their ingenuity—a system
loath to incorporate competition and customer choice in steering us
toward prosperity."
—William F. Welds
INTRODUCTION
William F. Weld was elected Governor of Massachusetts in the
midst of an economic recession that had demystified the fabled "Mas-
sachusetts Miracle" of the 1980s, and a fiscal crisis that had left the
Commonwealth with ballooning budget deficits and disintegrating bond
ratings.2
 Weld, a fiscally conservative Republican, had promised voters
that he would lower taxes and slash government expenditures by the
sheer force of political will on the one hand, and by fundamentally
changing the method by which government delivers services on the
other.3
 Soon after taking office, he began to make good on those
promises by submitting the first of many balanced budget and tax
reduction proposals to the Legislature, 4 and embarking on a campaign
Governor William F. Weld, Inaugural Address (Jan. 3, 1991), in EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR
ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE, COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, PRIVATIZATION IN MASSA-
CHUSETTS: GETTING RESULTS 33 (1993),
2 1n the November 1990 general election, Weld narrowly defeated his democratic opponent,
Boston University Presidentiohn Silber. See Peter G. Gosselin, Weld's Economic Challenge, BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov. 11, 1990, at. Al, for a discussion of the many challenges Weld faced at the time of
his election.
3
 See, e.g., Scot Lehigh, Budget Deficit Seen as Weld's Worst Problem, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. I,
1991, at I.
4 See, e.g., Frank Phillips, Education, Local Aid, Human Services Hit, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 1,
1991, at 1.
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to privatize many services traditionally delivered by state government
agencies.5
The Governor's views on privatization are guided by the belief that
while there is a realm in which public sector entities are the most
effective deliverers of services, numerous activities traditionally under-
taken by state government agencies fall outside of this realm. 6
 The
Weld Administration has sought to identify such activities and to change
the method of undertaking them so as to benefit from the cost efficien-
cies that private sector entities can bring to bear on the provision of
certain services.' Accordingly, the Commonwealth has entered into
"privatization contracts" for, among other services, skating rink man-
agement, highway maintenance and child support enforcernent. 8
The Weld Administration has argued that as a result of these and
other initiatives undertaken during the Governor's first two years in
office, the Commonwealth saved $273 million and increased the quan-
tity and quality of the services provided.° The diverse group of indi-
viduals who have opposed the Governor's privatization initiatives, how-
ever, have leveled a barrage of criticisms at the goals, mechanics and
results of privatization.m State employees, for example, charged the
Administration with union busting, and claimed that privatization was
costing the taxpayers money and disproportionately affecting minority
workers." These concerns ultimately led the Legislature to take a
position in the debate over privatization with the passage, in 1993, of
the Pacheco Act. 12 The opening sentence of the Act reads: 'The gen-
eral court hereby finds and declares that using private contractors to
provide public services formerly provided by state employees does not
always promote the public interest.'" This declaration reveals that
legislators intended not merely to enact a system of safeguards for
See, e.g., Bruce M0111 and Frank Phillips, Weld States His Business: Takes Office, Vows New
Approach, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 4, 1991, at 1.
6 See, e.g., Governor William F. Weld, Address to Executive Branch interns July 15, 1995).
7 See generally EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE, supra note 1.
See id. at 20-30.
9 See id. at 1.
1 ° See id. at 31-64 (explaining and countering charges made against privatization).
11 See id. at 33-34, 40-42, 47-48.
12 1993 Mass. Acts 296 (Governor Weld vetoed the bill, only to be overridden by the Legislature).
13 MASS. GEN. Lnws ch. 7, § 52 (1994). The full text reads as follows:
The general court hereby finds and declares that using private contractors to
provide public services formerly provided by state employees does not always pro-
mote the public interest_ To ensure that citizens of the commonwealth receive high
quality public services at low cost, with due regard for the taxpayers of the com-
monwealth and the needs of public and private workers, the general court finds it
necessary to regulate such privatization in accordance with sections fifty-three to
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assigning government contracts, but to put the Weld Administration
on notice that further efforts to privatize government services would
be actively resisted by lawmakers."
The statute outlines a process that executive branch agencies must
follow before contracting with a private company for the provision of
services delivered by state employees.' 5
 The statute applies to any such
privatization contract with an aggregate value of at least $100,000. 16 An
agency must demonstrate that the total cost to perform the service by
private contract will be less than the in-house cost, and that the quality
of the service provided will not decline.' 7
 The agency must also ensure
that private contracts, if awarded, contain certain provisions regarding
wages, health insurance, the hiring of qualified agency employees,
nondiscrimination and affirmative action.'s The agency must submit
its plans to the State Auditor, who determines whether the agency has
met the statute's various requirements.' 9
The law thus establishes both procedural requirements and sub-
stantive standards for the grant of contracts to private sector firms. 2"
fifty-five inclusive. The general court does not intend to restrict the use of commu-
nity facilities to provide care for clients of state agencies, if any privatization contract
relating to such facilities otherwise complies with the provisions of said sections
fifty-three to fifty-five, inclusive.
Id.
" See id.
15 See id. § 53. The law also applies to various independent authorities, as illustrated by the
definition of agency: "'Agency', an executive office, department, division, board, commission or
other office or officer in the executive branch of the government of the commonwealth, the
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority and the Mas-
sachusetts Port Authority." Id,
18
 See id. Privatization contract is defined as follows:
"Privatization contract", an agreement or combination or series of agreements by
which a non-governmental person or entity agrees with an agency to provide
services, valued at one-hundred thousand dollars or inure, which are substantially
similar to and in lieu of services theretofore provided, in whole or in part, by regular
employees of an agency. Any subsequent agreement, including any agreement
resulting limn a re-bidding of previously privatized service, or any agreement
renewing or extending a privatization contract, shall not be considered a privatiza-
tion contract. An agreement solely to provide legal, management consulting, plan-
ning, engineering or design services shall not be considered a privatization con-
tract.
Id.
17 See id. § 54(7) (ii)—(iii). The agency must prepare a detailed "statement of services" that
estimates the most cost-efficient method of providing the service with agency employees, select
a private contractor through a competitive bidding process and then compare the in-house cost
with the cost of the contract. See id. § 54(l), (4)—(6).
18 See MASS. GEN. Laws ch. 7, § 54(2)—(3) (1994).
19 See id. § 55 (suiting that State Auditor is constitutional officer, elected by the citizens of
Commonwealth every four years).
20 See id. §§ 52-55.
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The procedural requirements force reflection and analysis by executive
branch agencies, and expose the decision-making process to inde-
pendent scrutiny by the State Auditor and, ultimately, the media and
people of the Commonwealth. 2 ' The substantive standards forbid agen-
cies from privatizing unless services of equal quality can be provided
at a lesser cost by private contractors. 22
The Governor has attacked the Pacheco Act as an attempt to
preserve an untenable status quo:
This bill is a huge barrier to change, and preserves nothing
but the status quo. To dispense with any diplomatic niceties,
this legislation is little more than a State Employee Preserva-
tion Act. It puts preserving jobs for state workers ahead of
cost-efficient, quality services for the people of this state.23
The Weld Administration has also criticized the statute for erecting
unfair barriers to privatization." Although the statute does erect
obstacles, it does not prevent an agency from privatizing a service
when that agency properly compiles an analysis showing that a
particular service would be more effectively delivered by a private
contractor.25 Thus, opponents of privatization must employ addi-
tional devices to prevent agencies from contracting with private
sector entities for the provision of services delivered by state em-
ployees. 26
This Note does not discuss whether privatization efforts represent
sound public policy, but rests upon the fact that there is genuine
disagreement on this point in the body politic. Neither does this Note
address the constitutionality of privatizing government services—a ques-
tion already much discussed in the growing literature in this field.
Rather, this Note delves into the tactics that lawmakers employ in
challenging or defending particular proposals to privatize services.
Specifically, this Note considers the constitutionality of the appropria-
tion restriction, a legislative tactic that has been used by opponents
of privatization in other states 27 and seems ripe for use in Massachu-
21 See id. §§ 54-55.
22 see id. § 54 .
"Governor William F. Weld, Testimony Before the joint Committee on State Administration,
in EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE, Supra note 1, at 49.
24 See id. at 49-54. Weld claimed, for example, that the bill requires the cost of competitive
bids to be artificially inflated and the cost of services provided by state employees to be artificially
deflated. See id at 49.
25 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 7, §§ 54(7), 55 (1994).
26 For example, the Legislature might change the requirements of the Pacheco Act so as to
make it more difficult for the Administration to advance privatization proposals,
27 Legislators in New Mexico, for example, employed an appropriation restriction in an effort
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setts. 28
 The appropriation restriction is a creature of the budget proc-
ess; to oppose an executive branch agency's plan to privatize a particu-
lar program, the Legislature might structure a budget line-item in such
a way as to condition funding for the program on its being provided
by public employees. 29
 In response, the Governor would likely use his
line-item veto power to excise this condition, thus allowing the agency
to contract with a private sector entity for the provision of services
related to the program. 3° A legal struggle over the validity of that
line-item veto would likely ensue.
This Note argues that any attempt by the Massachusetts Legisla-
ture to legislate how certain government services must be delivered
constitutes an improper invasion of the executive function. 3 ' Part I of
this Note explores the limits of the Governor's line-item veto power. 32
Part II discusses the respective roles of the Legislature and Executive
under the Massachusetts Constitution) Part III poses a hypothetical
appropriation battle between those branches over a condition in an
appropriation for prison services, and examines how the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC") might resolve the disputes' The Note
concludes that the SJC should declare the appropriation restriction an
unconstitutional method of halting privatization efforts. 35
I. THE GOVERNOR'S LINE-ITEM VETO POWER
The Massachusetts Constitution grants the Governor two types of
veto power. 38 Pursuant to the constitution's general provisions on the
executive branch, the Governor may veto any measure placed before
to prevent the privatization of a commodities support program. See State v. Carruthers, 759 P.2d
1380, 1387 (N.M. 1988).
"Indeed, in the late spring of 1995, during the legislative debates on the Fiscal Year 1996
budget, Governor Weld's Office of Legal Counsel prepared to make the case against the consti-
tutionality of the appropriation restriction. Anticipating the use of such measures in the line items
for several or the Commonwealth's mental hospitals, the Governor's lawyers drafted briefs to
accompany their planned request for an advisory opinion of the Supreme judicial Court on the
subject. The occasion to seek the opinion of the Commonwealth's highest court, however, did
not arise.
29
 Accord Carruthers, 759 P.2d at 1387 ("It is the intent of the legislature that the appropria-
tion of six hundred forty thousand dollars ($640,000) to the commodities support bureau shall
not be expended to contract with a non-governmental contractor for warehousing and delivery
in the commodities support program.").
30
 Accord id.
31
 See infra notes 183-248 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 36-118 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 119-82 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 185-248 and accompanying text.
35
 See infra notes 183-248 and accompanying text.
36 See Mass. CONS r. Part 11, ch. 1, § I, art. 2; MASS. CONST, amend, art. 63, § 5.
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him by the Legislature. 37 Pursuant to article 63 of the amendments to
the constitution, the Governor may also "[d]isapprove or reduce items
or parts of items in any bill appropriating money."" This line-item veto
power enables the Governor to remove portions of appropriation bills
before signing the remainder of those bills into law." The SJC has
delineated the scope of this power in a series of cases spanning the
past sixty years. 4°
In a 1936 Opinion of the Justices, the SJC established the basic
framework for analyzing gubernatorial exercises of the line-item veto
power.'" The opinion involved a general appropriation bill that con-
tained a line item authorizing the payment of $100,000 for "extraordi-
nary expenses."42 The line item contained language designating $65,000
of the total for particular extraordinary expenses, such as entertaining
the President of the United States." The Governor approved the $100,000
sum, but vetoed the restrictions placed upon its expenditure."
The SJC ruled the Governor's veto invalid, reasoning that article
63 does not give the Governor the power to remove restrictions im-
posed upon the use of appropriated funds." The court explained that
article 63's limited application to appropriation bills indicated that the
expression "items or parts of items" refers to separable fiscal units and
not to words or phrases.46 The court reasoned that by removing the
restrictions in question, the Governor had effectively enlarged the
31 See MASS. CoNs.r. Part 11, ch. 1, § 1, art. 2.
38 MASS. CONST. amend. art. 63, § 5. The full text reads as Follows:
Section 5. Submission to the Governor: The governor may disapprove or reduce
items or parts of items in any bill appropriating money. So much of such bill as he
approves shall upon his signing the same become law. As to each item disapproved
or reduced, he shall transmit to the house in which the bill originated his reason
for such disapproval or reduction, and the procedure shall then be the same as in
the case of a hill disapproved as a whole. In case he shall fail so to transmit his
reasons for such disapproval or reduction within five days after the bill shall have
been presented to him, such items shall have the force of law unless the general
court by adjournment shall prevent such transmission, in which case they shall not
be law.
Id.
39 See id.
49 See Opinion of the Justices, 643 N.E.2d 1036 (Mass. 1994); Barnes v. Secretary of Admin.,
586 N.E.2d 958 (Mass. 1992); Opinion of the Justices, 582 N.E.2d 504 (Mass. 1991); Opinion of
the Justices, 428 N.E.2d 117 (Mass. 1981); Attorney Gen. v. Administrative Justice, 427 N.E.2d 735
(Mass. 1981); Opinion of the Justices, 212 N.E.2d 562 (Mass. 1965); Opinion of the Justices, 2
N.E.2d 789 (Mass. 1936).
41 See Opinion of the Justices, 2 N.E.2d at 790-91.
42 /d. at 790.
43 See id.
44 See id.
45 1d. at 791.
443 Opinion of the justices, 2 N.E.2d at 790.
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appropriation made by the Legislature by Itihrowing the $100,000
into a common fund to be used for any one of several different
purposes."47
 The court explained further that only the Legislature has
the power to enlarge appropriations—the Governor's role in the ap-
propriation process is limited to either reducing or eliminating line
items." As a result, the court deemed the Governor's attempt to re-
move the restrictive language from the appropriation an invalid exer-
cise of his article 63 veto power." In the years since formulating this
basic framework, the court has analyzed many line-item vetoes and
clarified its jurisprudence on the scope of article 63. 5°
In 1981, in Attorney General v. Administrative Justice of the Boston
Municipal Court Department of the Trial Court, the SJC ruled that article
63 does not necessarily prevent the Governor from removing language
from a budget bill that appears to constitute a restriction on an appro-
priation.51
 Attorney General involved the 1982 fiscal year general appro-
priation bill that included funding for the housing court department
of the Commonwealth's trial court system; the appropriation did not
include funding for the administrative office of the housing court
department." Another line item, providing funding for the Boston
municipal court, stated that the municipal court's administrative jus-
tice would assume the duties of the administrative justice for the
housing court department." The Governor vetoed the portion of the
line item that transferred authority over the housing court department
to the municipal court's administrative justice. 54 The SJC determined
that the veto constituted a proper exercise of the Governor's article 63
powers. 55
47 1d. at 791.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50
 See infra notes 51-108 and accompanying text. In addition to considering the issues
discussed therein, the SIC has also, for example, sought to determine when the Governor actually
has before him a bill that is subject to an article 63 veto. See Opinion of the Justices, 212 N.E.2d at
565-67. The Governor reduced the amount approved by the Legislature in the annual county
bill. See id. at 564. The bill authorized the counties of the Commonwealth to spend certain moneys
for certain items and authorized them to raise these amounts by levying county taxes. See id. at
565-66. The court held that the bill was not an appropriations bill and that the Governor thus
had no power to reduce the amounts established by the Legislature. Id. at 567. The court
reasoned that the bill purported to make no appropriation of state funds from the treasury of
the Commonwealth and that the substance, rather than the form, of the bill controlled its
interpretation. See id. at 566-67.
81 See Attorney Gen., 427 N.E.2d at 738-39.
52 1d. at 736.
53 See id. at 737.
54 See id.
55 Id. at 738-39.
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The court noted that the history and language of article 63 dic-
tated that the Governor could eliminate or reduce any separable provi-
sion in a general appropriation bill. 56 The court reasoned that a pro-
vision is separable, and thus susceptible to a line-item veto, if it does
not direct the way an appropriation is to be used. 57 The court explained
that it determines if an item is separable by analyzing whether deletion
of the item 1) alters the purpose of the appropriation, or 2) eliminates
a valid restriction or condition on the appropriation.58
The court determined that deletion of the transfer provision would
not affect the purpose of the appropriation, which was to provide funds
for the operation of the municipal and housing courts." Further, the
court noted that the language in the line item ("[p]rovided that . .
the administrative justice of said Boston municipal court department
shall serve as the administrative justice of the housing court") did not
appear on its face to constitute a condition or restriction on the
expenditure of funds." The court contrasted this language with word-
ing it had deemed restrictive in the past, such as "[s]ubject, however,
to the condition that."61
 The court then explained: "While we do not
intimate that skillful drafting may transform a separable provision of
general legislation to a restriction or condition, we note that the
Legislature here did not use conditional or restrictive wording in the
disapproved provisions."62 In addition, the court explained that in
contrast to the veto invalidated in the 1936 Opinion of the Justices, this
veto served neither to enlarge an appropriation nor infringe on the
Legislature's power to set apart certain sums of money for specified
purposes The SJC thus upheld the Governor's act as a valid exercise
of the article 63 veto power
In another 1981 case, Opinion of the Justices, the court further
clarified the nature of a restriction on an appropriation by addressing
36 Attorney Gen., 427 N.E.2d at 737 (citing Opinion of the Justices, 425 N.E.2d 750, 752-53
(Mass. 1981)) (emphasis added).
37 See id. at 738. The court noted that this is the majority view in states which permit partial
vetoes and cited a number of cases from other jurisdictions. Id. at 738 n.3 (citing State ex rel.
Turner v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 186 N.W.2d 141, 150-51 (Iowa 1971); Henry v. Edwards,
346 So. 2d 153, 157-58 (La. 1977); State ex rel. Cason v. Bond, 495 S.W.2d 385, 389-90 (Mo.
1973)).
33 Id.
33 Id.
5° Id.
61 Attorney Gen., 427 N.E.2d at 738-39 (citing Opinion of theJustices, 2 N.E.2d at 790).
62 Id. at 738 (emphasis added).
33 Id.
" Id.
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three budget provisions the Governor had vetoed.° Line item 1101-
2100 appropriated money for the Fiscal Affairs Division of the Execu-
tive Office of Administration and Finance. 66 The Governor vetoed
language in this line item that required the Commissioner of Admini-
stration to report to the House and Senate Ways and Means Commit-
tees on the progress of collective bargaining negotiations. 67 Line item
1201-0100 appropriated money for the Department of Revenue.° The
Governor vetoed language in this line item that required the Governor
to file periodic revenue reports with the Legislature and participate in
ensuring that state government outlays would not exceed revenues in
the course of a fiscal year.°
In deeming these vetoes legitimate, the court reasoned that the
language the Governor had deleted from the bill neither directed the
manner in which appropriated funds were to be used nor imposed
restrictions or conditions on the expenditure of funds:7° The court
explained that the deleted language had not even referred to the
executive branch bodies being funded by the line items:n The court
reasoned that despite the administrative connections between the Fis-
cal Affairs Division and the Commissioner of Administration on the
one hand, and the Department of Revenue and the Governor on the
other, the language removed by the Governor's veto did not relate to
the use of funds appropriated for the operation of those executive
branch agencies. 72 The court thus held that the language, although
65 See Opinion of the justices, 428 N.E.2d at 118-23. The first three of the six questions related
to a budget issue already resolved by the SJC in Attorney Gen., 427 N.E.2d at 738-39. See Opinion
of the justices, 428 N.E.2d at 120.
66
 See id.
67 See id. The line item read, in pertinent part and with vetoed portions in brackets, as follows:
Fiscal Affairs Division. For the administration of the division; [provided that during
the negotiation of any collective bargaining agreement the commissioner shall file
with the house and senate committees on ways and means the provisions of each
offer made by the Commonwealth . .] including not more than forty-nine perma-
nent positions. . . $1,337,200.
Id. (emphasis added).
65 See id. at 121.
1.' 9 See id. The line item read, in pertinent part and with vetoed portions in brackets, as follows:
For the administration of the department, [and provided further that no moneys
shall be allotted to said department unless the following provisions were imple-
mented in the previous quarter . . .1 including audits ... $29,014,000.
Id. (emphasis added).
70 Opinion of the Justices, 428 N.E.2d at 120, 122.
71 Id. The Commissioner of Administration, who was burdened by the vetoed language in
item 1101-2100, is not an employee of the Fiscal Affairs Division; similarly, the Governor, who
was burdened by the vetoed language in item 1201-0100, is not an employee of the Department
of Revenue. See id.
72 Id. at 121, 122.
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conditional on its face, was separable, noting again that skillful drafting
cannot convert a separable piece of legislation to a restriction or
condition on the expenditure of an appropriation."
On the third budget issue, by contrast, the SJC held that the
Governor had exceeded his article 63 powers." Line item 4800-0010
appropriated money for the Department of Social Services ("DSS")
and set guidelines for levels of spending for day care and battered
women programs.''`' The Governor did not change the total appropria-
tion for DSS, but attempted to delete the language which required
certain levels of funding for particular programs. 76
The court reasoned that the provisions at issue reflected the Leg-
islature's intent to allocate certain portions of the appropriations for
day care and battered women programs. 77 Thus, the deletion of those
provisions directly affected the legislative purpose underlying the budget
line item. 78
 The court reasoned that the Governor had violated the
principle that it is for the Legislature to determine which social objec-
tives or programs are worthy of funding. 79
 The court thus concluded
that the language at issue was an inseparable restriction that the Gov-
ernor could not remove by an article 63 veto. 8°
The court solidified its views on that which constitutes an insepa-
rable restriction in a 1991 Opinion of the Justices, in which it considered
a number of line-item vetoes regarding three budget issues. 81 Line item
9221-1000 appropriated money for the Commissioner of Banks and
made the funding contingent on the passage of a number of outside
sections.82
 These outside sections altered the Deposit Insurance Fund
("Fund"), an entity regulated by the Commissioner of Banks.83 The
court reasoned that the outside sections were directed at the Fund and
not at the Commissioner. 84
 Consequently, the outside sections did not
impose a condition or restriction directly related to the use of the
appropriated funds, and their deletion did not impact the legislative
73 Id. at 122 (citing Attorney Geri., 427 N.E.2d at 738).
74 Id. at 123.
7!'
	 Opinion of the Justices, 428 N.E.2d at 122
-23.
71; See id.
77 Id. at 123.
7" See id.
79 Id. at 123 (citing Opinion of the Justices, 376 N.E.2d 1217,1221 (Mass. 1978)).
"" Opinion of the justices, 428 N.E.2d at 123.
Al
 See Opinion of the justices, 582 N.E.2d at 509-13.
"2 See id. at 509-10.
88 See id. at 510.
"1 Id.
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purpose of funding the Commissioner's office." The court thus held
that the Governor's vetoes of the outside sections were valid, despite
the Legislature's attempt to make their passage a condition precedent
to the appropriation. 85
Line item 0340-0130 appropriated money for the victim and wit-
ness assistance programs of eleven district attorneys' offices. 87 The
Governor vetoed language that expressly permitted the district attor-
neys to use these funds for salaries and litigation expenses." The court
reasoned that the Legislature had not specifically directed any part of
the appropriation to be spent on salaries or expenses for litigation."
Because the entire sum was thus already available for other program
needs, the Governor had not enlarged the appropriation for those
programs by removing the language regarding salaries and litigation
expenses."" Therefore, because the Governor had not lifted restraints
on the use of the appropriated money or made money available for
particular items that was not already available, the court deemed his
veto valid pursuant to article 63. 9 '
On the third budget issue, the SAC held that although the Gover-
nor had overstepped his article 63 powers by removing language from
line items appropriating money for the Department of Environmental
Management ("DEM") and the Metropolitan District Commission
("MDC"), his veto of related outside sections was constitutionally valid."
Line items 2100-0001 and 2440-0012 appropriated funds for DEM's
division of parks and the MDC's division of parks and recreation." The
Governor vetoed language in those line items that specified that the
funds could not be expended until sufficient revenue was present in
the revolving funds of those agencies."' A related measure, outside
section 50, established the aforementioned revolving funds."
The court explained that the Legislature had specified a particular
source of funding for a reason: to ensure that the entities named in
85 See id.
RH Opinion of the .Jusiices, 582 N.E.2d at 510.
" See id. al 511.
" See id.
H9
 Id. at 512.
9° See id.
91 Opinion of the Justices, 582 N.E.2d at 512.
Id. at 511.
"See id. at 510-11.
94 See id. at 511.
95 See id.
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the line items operated in a fiscally responsible manner. 9° The SJC
reasoned that the Governor's veto, which removed references to the
revolving funds, would thus alter the legislative purpose underlying the
line items.97
 The court held, however, that the Governor was within his
article 63 powers in vetoing the outside section that established the
revolving funds. 98
 The court explained this apparent contradiction,
saying, "[t] he Governor cannot be deprived of his authority to veto a
separable, outside section on the ground that, by doing so, certain
items are rendered ineffective. It is as though the Governor disap-
proved those items in their entirety, a result that would be constitution-
ally permissible."99
 The court thus invalidated the Governor's veto of
the language within the budget line items but upheld his veto of the
related outside section, ruling it within the scope of his article 63
powers.'°°
Lastly, in Barnes v. Secretary of Administration, the SJC established
that it would not examine the Governor's motives when analyzing his
use of the article 63 veto power. 10 ' This 1992 case involved a budget
proposal in which the Governor had suggested a substantial restruc-
turing of a certain welfare program and a correspondingly smaller
appropriation than had been allocated the previous year. 102 The Legis-
lature ignored these suggestions and appropriated significantly more
money for the program than had the Governor. 103
 Upon receiving the
general appropriation bill, the Governor reduced the amount of the
appropriation and, in an accompanying message to the Legislature,
explained that his purpose was to force changes in the structure of the
program.'°4
The Legislature 105
 argued that the court should invalidate the
Governor's veto, because he had attempted to accomplish through
"defunding" what he could not accomplish through the legislative
process. 1 °6
 The court rejected this argument and stated that it would
not look behind the substance of the Governor's action or engage in
96
 Opinion of the Justices. 582 N.E.2d at 511.
97 Id.
98 Id. (citing Opinion of the Justices, 425 N.E.2d 750, 753-54 (Mass. 1981)).
99 Id. at 511.
1 "0 Id.
'° 1 See 586 N.E.2d at 961.
192
 Id. at 959.
193 See id.
104 See id.
196-Me plaintiffs were actually a group of non-profit agencies seeking a declaratory judgment
that the Governor had exceeded his article 63 veto powers. See id. at 958 & n.11.
'6 See Barnes, 586 N.E.2d at 961.
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an analysis of his motives. 107 The court explained that the Governor
had simply reduced the sum appropriated for a program; this action
was in accordance with the plain language of article 63 and was thus
a proper exercise of his line-item veto power.'"
The Supreme Judicial Court's jurisprudence on the scope of the
Governor's article 63 veto power has become well-defined after sixty
years of development.m According to the language of article 63 itself,
the Governor may eliminate or reduce "items or parts of items" in any
bill appropriating money.' 1 ° The constitutional expression "items or
parts of items" refers to separable fiscal units."' At one time, the SJC
narrowly defined "separable fiscal unit" as monetary figures only. 112
Today, however, certain words and phrases also qualify as separable." 3
To determine whether a provision is separable, the SJC considers
the consequences of its being vetoed." 4 Specifically, the court analyzes
whether the deletion of a provision alters the purposes of the appro-
priation or eliminates a valid condition or restriction on it." 5 The court
thus looks beyond the language of the provision at issue, emphasizing
that skillful drafting cannot transform a separable piece of legislation
into a restriction or condition." 8 Further, the SJC will not make any
effort to identify the Governor's reasons for exercising his line-item
veto power.' l7
 The court is, however, careful to ensure that the Gover-
nor has not effectively enlarged an appropriation for a particular
purpose and thus infringed upon the Legislature's right and obligation
to order social priorities." 8
II. SEPARATION OF POWERS
In addition to limiting the Governor's ability to infringe on the
legislative function, the SJC is concerned about the Legislature infring-
1071d.
log Id. ("We have never inquired into a Governor's motives in the use of the line item veto
power, The language of the constitutional amendment clearly authorizes the Governor's reduc-
tion; his action was wholly lawful, and our inquiry ends there.").
109 See supra notes 36-108 and accompanying text.
" 6 MASS. CONST. amend. art. 63, § 5.
111
 See Opinion of the. Justices, 2 N.E.2d at 790.
112 See id.
113 See, e.g., Attorney Gen., 427 N.E.2cl at 738-39 (holding that words effecting transfer of
administrative responsibilities for housing court department were properly vetoed).
114 See id. at 738.
" 5
 See id.
116 See id.
117 See Barnes, 586 N.E.2d at 961.
118 See Attorney Gen., 427 N.E.2d at 738.
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ing on the province of the Executive."' The Commonwealth's separa-
tion of powers provision, like those of only a handful of other states,
is more explicit than the federal Constitution in that it calls for a
complete and rigid division of the three branches. 12° Article 30 of the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights provides: "In the government of
the Commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the
executive and judicial powers . . . to the end it may be a government
of laws and not of men." 121
 Recognizing this rigidity in the constitu-
tional scheme, the SJC early declared itself, "[e]ver solicitous to main-
tain the sharp division between the three departments of govern-
ment."122 At the same time, the court has recognized that an absolute
division of the three branches is neither possible nor desirable.' 23 Thus,
some flexibility in allocating functions is desirable, as long as "kilt
creates no interference by . . . [one] department with the power of . . .
[another] department. ”124
In a 1978 Opinion of the Justices, the SJC delineated the respective
powers of the Legislature and Executive in the appropriation proc-
ess.' 25 In that case, the court considered the constitutionality of an act
that would have required executive branch agencies to spend appro-
priated funds in their entirety. 128 The legislation permitted agencies to
make less than full expenditure only with the approval of both houses
of the Legislature.' 27 The court stated that the Legislature has the
power to make laws consistent with the constitution, and thus "fflocus
the energies of society into the accomplishment of designated objec-
tives or programs." 128 The appropriation process provides a crucial
means by which the Legislature exercises its lawmaking power to ac-
119 See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 429 N.E.2d 1019 (Mass. 1981); Opinion of the Justices,
376 N.E.2d 1217 (Mass. 1978); Opinion of the Justices, 341 N.E.2d 254 (Mass. 1976).
I"See Opinion of the Justices, 309 N.E.2d 476, 478 (Mass. 1974).
121 MASS. CONST. Part I, art. 30. The full text reads as follows:
In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never
exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them: the executive shall
never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: the judicial
shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the
end it may be a government of laws and not men.
Id.
I 22 Attorney Gen. v. llrissenden, 171 N.E. 82, 87 (Mass. 1930).
123 See Opinion of the justices, 309 N.E.2d at 478.
124 Id. at 479 (quoting Opinion of the Justices, 94 N.E. 852, 853 (Mass. 1911)).
125 See Opinion of the Justices, 376 N.E.2d at 1220-23.
1 '46 Id. at 1218.
127 See id. at 1219.
128 1d. at 1220.
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complish social purposes.' 29
 The court explained, however, that it is the
constitutional prerogative and duty of the Governor to execute the
laws.'" As "supreme executive magistrate" of the Commonwealth, the
Governor has exclusive authority to implement the policies and goals
for which the Legislature appropriates funds." Further, the Governor
may use discretion in applying the energies of the executive branch in
achieving legislative goais.132
Turning to the full expenditure requirement, the court reasoned
that the Governor must be allowed some discretion in executing the
laws and must not be forced to spend money in a wasteful fashion,
provided that he does not compromise the achievement of underlying
legislative purposes. 133
 The court explained that it is an executive func-
tion to make spending decisions: "hi nasmuch as it is the function of
the executive branch to expend funds, it must be implied that the
`supreme executive magistrate,' as one of the three co-equal branches
of government, is not obliged to spend money foolishly or needlessly." 134
Having established that the Governor has a constitutional prerogative
to spend less than the full amount of an appropriation, the court
considered the legislation's provision allowing the Governor to do so
only with the approval of the Legislature.' 35
The SJC reasoned that a vote in the Legislature regarding a re-
quest by the Governor to spend less than the full amount of an appro-
priation would constitute "legislation" not subject to gubernatorial
veto.° Such a "legislative veto" of proposed gubernatorial action would
constitute, "lain open-ended means of regulating the conduct of mem-
bers of the executive branch according to the consensus of the Houses
of the Legislature." 137
 The court decided that this abrogation of the
Governor's veto power was unconstitutional. 138
 The legislation would
have prevented the Governor from both vetoing legislative action and
exercising his discretion in spending funds.'" In light of these inter-
' 29 See id.
I" Opinion of the Justices, 376 N.E.2d at 1221.
131 See id. (citing MASS. CousT. Part 11, ch. 2, § 1, art. 1).
In See id.
133 Id. at 1222-23.
134 Id.
135 See Opinion of the Justices, 376 N.E,2d at 1223.
158 Id.
137 1d.
' 38 Id. (describing violation of Part II, chapter 1, section I, article 2 of Massachusetts Consti-
tution requiring that hills be laid before Governor before gaining force of law).
139 See id. at 1224.
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locking infirmities, the court held that the legislation violated the
principle of separation of powers embodied in article 30 of the consti-
tution."°
In a 1981 Opinion of the Justices, the SJC invalidated another such
legislative veto."' Senate Bill No. 2335 required executive branch de-
partments to obtain approval from the Legislature before enacting
plans to alter certain specified public benefit programs."' The Gover-
nor vetoed the bill and proposed replacing the requirement that the
agency receive approval from the Legislature with a requirement that
it merely notify the Legislature of impending changes." 3 The Governor
noted that the mechanism he proposed would give the Legislature an
active role in developing policies relating to federally subsidized wel-
fare programs, while preserving his constitutional prerogatives,'"
The Governor argued that the bill would violate the doctrine of
separation of powers by immunizing legislative action from the execu-
tive veto and giving the Legislature an ongoing right of prior approval
as to the manner in which a program is executed, thus impairing the
executive prerogative of executing the laws.'" The court agreed, invali-
dating the bill on the grounds that the effect of the Legislature's
proposal would be to abrogate the Governor's veto power.' 40 The SJC
thus held that the bill violated the Massachusetts Constitution by re-
quiring legislative approval of executive branch decisions regarding
plans for altering public benefit programs.' 47
A 1976 Opinion of the Justices held another such legislative veto
invalid—this one regarding executive branch staffing. 148 In an effort to
reduce public expenditures, the Legislature had passed a bill forbid-
ding the filling of vacancies in state positions in the absence of a
"critical need." 49 The bill required the Governor to receive the ap-
proval of both the House and Senate Ways and Means Committees
before appointing or promoting personnel to fill vacancies.'50
1411 See Opinion of the justices, 376 N.E.2d at 1225.
141 See Opinion of the Justices, 429 N.E.2d at 1020-22; see also Opinion of the justices, 493
N.E.2d 859, 861-65 (Mass. 1986) (invalidating measure that would have required legislative
approval of decisions of executive branch on low-level radioactive waste site licenses).
142 See Opinion of the justices, 429 N.E.2d at 1019-20.
143 See id. at 1020.
1 +1 See id.
145 See id.
148 See id. at 1022.
147 Opinion of the justices, 429 N.E.2d at 1022:
148 See Opinion of the Justices, 341 N.E.2d at 255-58.
149 See id. at 256.
150
 See id. at 255.
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The court noted that the Legislature could have limited appro-
priations to pay state officers and employees, provided funds only for
cases of "critical need," and delegated to appropriate executive officers
the power to determine what positions were critical.''' By requiring
legislative approval of the Governor's decisions as to what positions in
the executive branch were "critical," however, the Legislature had done
something fundamentally different. 12 The court reasoned that legisla-
tive approval of such gubernatorial determinations would require the
exercise of judgment and discretion in the expenditure of money by
legislative officers.'" The court concluded that "No entrust the execu-
tive power of expenditure to legislative officers is to violate art. 30 by
authorizing the legislative department to exercise executive powers." 154
The court noted that flexibility in the allocation of functions may
sometimes be permissible, but only if it creates no interference by one
department with the power of another.'" In this case, the legislation
created such interference by entrusting the executive power of expen-
diture to the Legislature in violation of the constitutional principle of
separation of powers embodied in article 30. 156
The SJC's separation of powers jurisprudence is thus well-defined.'"
The SJC has made clear that the Legislature has the power to make
laws consistent with the constitution, and consequently, to order the
Commonwealth's social priorities.'" The Governor, however, has the
power to execute the laws, and has exclusive authority to implement
the policies and goals for which the Legislature appropriates funds.'"
The Governor's responsibility for executing the laws carries with it an
authority to use discretion in spending appropriations.'" The SJC has
recognized that the exercise of this discretion is manifest in the allo-
cation of staff and resources, and that laws that entrust the executive
power of expenditure to legislative officers violate article 30 of the
Massachusetts Constitution."
The statutes invalidated by the SJC for infringing on the Gover-
nor's responsibility for making staffing and resource decisions all con-
151
 Id. at 256-57.
152 See id.
155 Opinion of the justices, 341 N.E.2d at 257.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 256.
156 See id. at 257.
157 See supra notes 119-56 and accompanying text.
155 See Opinion of the justices, 376 N.E.2d at 1220.
159 See id. at 1221.
16° See id.
1 " 1 See Opinion of the justices, 341 N.E,2d at 257.
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tained a constitutionally objectionable "legislative veto."' 62
 The high
courts of other states have been called upon to decide cases involving
the executive's prerogatives in the staffing and resource allocation
realm in the absence of a legislative veto provision; like the SJC, they
have emphasized the executive's exclusive rights in this realm.' 63
In the 1978 case Anderson v. Lamm, the Colorado Supreme Court
held portions of a general appropriation bill invalid as violative of that
state's separation of powers doctrine.'" In Anderson, the Governor
vetoed a provision of a general appropriation bill that required the
Colorado Department of Social Services ("DSS") to fund a certain
number of full-time positions in each of the state's counties."" The
plaintiffs, members of the Colorado Legislature, challenged the validity
of the Governor's veto.' 66
 A district court dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a claim, reasoning that the vetoed provisions were
unconstitutional and thus finding no need to reach the issue of whether
the Governor used the line-item veto power properly. 167
The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed, reasoning that the
conditions on the number of full-time employees to be placed in each
county interfered with executive authority and were thus unconstitu-
11i2 See, 	 Opinion of the Justices, 429 N.E.2d at 1020; Opinion of the Justices, 376 N.E.2d at
1218-19; Opinion of the Justices, 341 N.E.2d at 255. Accord Opinion of the Judges, 532 A.2d 195,
195 (N.!-!. 1987) (invalidating appropriation item that would have required executive branch
departments to seek legislative approval before using funds appropriated for purchase of com-
puter equipment and maintenance of buildings and grounds); Karcher V. Kean, 462 A.2d 1273,
1281-82 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 479 A.2d 403, 414 (1984)
(invalidating appropriation items governing hiring and release of executive branch employees).
"See, e.g., Communications Workers v. Florio, 617 A.2d 223, 232-37 (NJ. 1992). The
Supreme Court of New Jersey invalidated a statute requiring the Governor to execute state
employee layoffs in accordance with a plan devised by the Legislature. See id. at 237. The
Legislature argued that the provision was to ensure that the personnel cuts required by a shorffitil
in funds were made in the most efficient manlier possible, with the least possible disruption in
the provision of state services. See id. at 234. The court responded:
Legislative oversight of or cooperation with the Executive was not necessary. . . .
Not only was the legislative mandate unnecessary for the effectuation of the statu-
tory scheme, but the Legislature's attempt to micro-manage the staffing and resource
allocations in administering the appropriated Ands was a serious intrusion on the
Governor's authority and ability to perform his constitutionally-delegated functions.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Anderson v. Lamm, 579 P.2d 620, 625-29 (Colo. 1978); State v.
Carruthers, 759 P.2d 1380, 1387-88 (N.M. 1989).
164 See Anderson, 579 P.2d at 626.
"15 Id.
166
 See id. at 622.
167 See id. Colorado's separation of powers provision appears in article III of the state constitution
and is substantially the same as article thirty of the Massachusetts Constitution:
The powers of the government of this stale are divided into three distinct depart-
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tional.'m The court agreed with the Governor's argument that the
executive branch needs flexibility to determine the proper allocation
of manpower. 1 "9
 The court reasoned that the constitution does not
permit the general assembly to interfere with the executive's power to
administer appropriated funds, which includes making specific staffing
and resource allocation decisions.'" The court thus invalidated the
Legislature's attempt to encroach on the Governor's prerogatives.ffl
Similarly, in the 1988 case State u Carruthers, the New Mexico
Supreme Court invalidated certain conditions the New Mexico Legis-
lature had placed upon the use of funds by the state's commodities
support bureau.' 72 The bill at issue stated: "It is the intent of the
legislature that the appropriation of six hundred forty thousand dollars
($640,000) to the commodities support bureau shall not be expended
to contract with a non-governmental contractor for warehousing and
delivery in the commodities support program."'" The Governor vetoed
this conditional language on the grounds that compliance would have
resulted in the unnecessary expenditure of taxpayer dollars.'"
The court reasoned that the basic purpose of the appropriation
of the $640,000 was to provide commodities to qualified recipients.'"
The court found it unacceptable for the Legislature to attempt to
hamper the Governor's control over those funds by prohibiting the
privatization of the services funded by the appropriated moneys. 175 The
court reasoned that the Governor's veto did not change the basic
purpose for which the fund was established; it merely removed a
condition that improperly limited the manner and means by which the
commodities could be delivered.'" The court thus upheld the Gover-
nor's veto.'"
ments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or collection of persons
charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments
shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others except as in this
constitution expressly directed or permitted.
Coto. CONST. art. III.
168 Anderson, 579 13.2d at 626.
16• Id. at 626.
1711 1d. at 62a-24.
171 See id. at 624.
172 See 759 P.2d at 1387.
173 Id.
174 See id.
175 Id.
171i Id. at 1388.
177 Carruthers, 759 1'.2(1 at 1388.
1741d,
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The Legislatures of Colorado and New Mexico thus attempted to
directly affect staffing and resource allocation through the budget
process.'" The high courts of those states invalidated these legislative
efforts to encroach on executive prerogatives by approving the Gover-
nors' decisions to veto the constitutionally objectionable budget lan-
guage.'" The SJC has, several times, invalidated a more subtle type of
legislative effort to control staffing and resource allocation—the legis-
lative veto.' 8 ' The court has not yet been asked to consider statutes, like
those invalidated in Anderson and Carruthers, that directly dictate a
particular outcome with regard to the use of government employees
or the source of services.' 82
III. THE APPROPRIATION RESTRICTION
The opponents of privatization in the Massachusetts Legislature
might seek to oppose an agency's plans to contract with a private sector
entity for the provision of certain services by embedding an appropria-
tion restriction in that agency's budget. By including budget language
that conditions an appropriation on public employees delivering the
services funded by a particular line item, the Legislature could effec-
tively prevent an executive branch agency from entering into privati-
zation contracts.' 85 While it seems clear that a legal battle over such
budget language would ensue, it is not clear how the constitutional
questions implicated by such an appropriation restriction would be
presented to the SJC. The Colorado Supreme Court's decision in
Anderson v. Lamm provides one possible model.' 84 There, the Governor
of Colorado vetoed certain provisions in an appropriation bill, legisla-
tors brought suit challenging that veto and the courts dismissed the
suit on the grounds that the vetoed language was unconstitutional and
should never have been included in the bill.'" Given the prevalence
of advisory opinions of the SJC in disputes between the Legislature and
Executive in the Massachusetts jurisprudential tradition, however, I
179 See Anderson, 579 P.2d at 626; Carruthers, 759 P.2d at 1387-88.
18° See Anderson, 579 P.2d at 626; Carruthers, 759 P.2d at 1387-88.
181 See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 429 N.E.2d at 1022; Opinion of the Justices, 376 N.E.2d at
1224; Opinion of the Justices, 341 N.E.2d at 257.
182 See Anderson, 579 P.2d at 626; Carruthers, 759 P.2d at 1387-88.
183 See, e.g., Carruthers, 759 P.2d at 1387-88. Indeed, this was the intent of the New Mexico
Legislature. See id.
184 See 579 P.2d at 622, 626.
185 See id.
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offer the following hypothetical as indicative of how the issue would
likely play out in this jurisdiction.' 86
The Governor of Massachusetts appoints Ms. New as the Commis-
sioner of the Department of Public Safety ("DPS"). In her former
position as a Deputy Commissioner at DPS, Ms. New was critical of the
department's efforts at rehabilitating prisoners. As Commissioner, she
enlists the aid of a management consulting firm to study the delivery
of educational and training services to inmates of the state prisons. 181
A six-month study reveals that Massachusetts' prisoners, as compared
to those of other states with comparable per capita expenditures, score
poorly on high school equivalency exams and have little success at
finding employment upon release. Commissioner New considers the
consultants' recommendations concerning the staffing and resource
needs of the state prison system and informs the Governor that various
services should be privatized.
DPS complies with all of the requirements of the Pacheco Act, and
Commissioner New demonstrates and certifies to the State Auditor that
better educational and training services can be delivered at a substan-
tially lower cost by a private contractor.' 88 The Governor submits his
budget proposal for the next fiscal year to the Legislature and proposes
decreasing line item xxxx-zzzz by twenty percent as compared to the
previous year; he also proposes altering the line item's language to
reflect the fact that the educational and training services will be pri-
vatized. 189 The public employees' unions are greatly troubled by this
development. The unions convince a number of influential members
of the House Ways and Means Committee to offer the following lan-
guage with line item xxxx-zzzz in the DPS budget:
For educational and training services in the state prisons,
[provided that these are delivered by employees of the De-
partment of Public Safety]. . . $5,000,000. 190
mAs evidenced by the citations throughout this Note, the court's jurisprudence on separa-
tion of powers and the extent of the Governor's line-item veto power has developed, in large
part, through the advisory opinion device.
187
 Ms. New need not meet the requirements of the Pacheco Act in choosing a consultant.
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 7, § 53 (1994) (exempting services like management consulting from
Pacheco Act's strictures).
ig8 See id. § 54.
i" See Mass. CONST. amend. 63, § 2 (imposing duty on Governor to submit budget to
Legislature for its consideration).
IN See id. § 3 (requiring Legislature to submit to Governor general appropriation bill).
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Upon receiving the general appropriation bill from the Legisla-
ture, the Governor vetoes the words contained in brackets and reduces
the amount of the appropriation to four million dollars. In an accom-
panying message to the Legislature, he explains that he intends to
increase the quality of the services provided to the inmates and reduce
the cost of providing them by contracting with private vendors.' 9' The
legislative sponsors, knowing that they do not have the votes to over-
ride this veto, request an opinion of the SJC as to the constitutionality
of the Governor's action; the Legislature poses the following questions:
1) May the Governor reduce the amount of the appropria-
tion for the Department of Public Safety where his intent is
to force the Legislature to accept the privatization of services?
2) May the Governor delete the language contained in
brackets from that same appropriation?
In light of its jurisprudence on articles 30 and 63 of the Massa-
chusetts Constitution, the SJC would likely answer both of the Legisla-
ture's questions in the affirmative.'" As for the question pertaining to
the Governor's reduction of the appropriation for DPS, the SJC has
established that sums of money are separable fiscal units that the
Governor has the power to eliminate or reduce pursuant to article 63
of the constitution.'" The court has also established that it will not
examine the motives underlying the Governor's exercise of his line-
item veto power.'" Thus, although the SJC might accept the argument
that the Governor is attempting to force privatization upon the Legis-
lature, it would still rule that the Governor has reduced the amount
of the appropriation for educational and training services in the state
prisons in accordance with the plain language of article 63. 195 The
court would thus answer the Legislature's first question in the affirma-
tive: the Governor may reduce the amount of the appropriation for
the Department of Public Safety.' 96
As for the Governor's deletion of certain language from line item
xxxx-zzzz: the court would surely note that the language, "[p] rovided
191 See id. § 5 (obliging Governor to inform the Legislature of his reasons for disapproving
items).
192 See infra notes 193-248 and accompanying text.
199 See, e.g., Barnes v. Secretary of Admin., 586 N.E.2d 958, 960 (Mass. 1992).
194 See id. at 961.
L99 See id.
196 See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
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that these [services] are delivered by employees of the Department of
Public Safety" is, on its face, clearly restrictive. Although the language
seems to constitute an inseparable part of line item xxxx-zzzz, the SJC
has consistently stated that skillful drafting will not convert a separable
piece of legislation into a restriction or condition. 197
 The court would
then seek to determine whether deletion of the bracketed language
alters the legislative purpose underlying the appropriation or elimi-
nates valid restrictions or conditions on it.I 98
To make these determinations, the SJC would seek to identify the
possible purposes underlying the DPS appropriation and then ask, 1)
whether each purpose is valid pursuant to separation of powers juris-
prudence, and 2) whether the Governor's veto has altered that pur-
pose.m If a proposed purpose is not valid pursuant to separation of
powers jurisprudence, the Governor's veto must stand. Further, if a
proposed purpose is valid but unaltered by the Governor's veto, the
veto must also stand.
A. Preservation of Public Employment as a Legislative Purpose
The Legislature would very likely argue that the primary purpose
underlying line item xxxx-zzzz is to preserve public employment. The
Legislature would argue that by appropriating five million dollars for
services that DPS employees would deliver, it has made a statement
concerning the value of public employment; it has exercised its power
to order social priorities, "[a]nd focus the energies of society into the
accomplishment of designated objectives or programs." 2°° The Legisla-
ture thus would charge that the Governor, by deleting the language
that provides for public employment, is not executing the law."' The
defenders of this appropriation restriction would claim that the Gov-
ernor is not implementing the policies and goals for which the Legis-
lature appropriated five million dollars. 202
The court, however, would likely decide that providing public
employment is not a valid legislative purpose. 203
 The fundamental prob-
lem with line item xxxx-zzzz is that it dictates how an executive branch
agency's organizational chart will be structured. The Legislature has
197
 See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. Administrative justice, 427 N.E.2d 735, 738 (Mass. 1981).
198 See, e.g., id.
199
 See id.
21111 See Opinion of the justices, 376 N.E.2d 1217, 1220 (Mass. 1978).
291 See id. at 1221.
292 See id.
2°5
 See, e.g., Carruthers, 759 P.2d at 1387-88.
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dictated that the Department of Public Safety assign state employees
to the task of delivering educational and training services in the state
prisons. The Legislature has thus established a staffing regime within
DPS. In doing so, the Legislature has usurped the executive function
of deciding how to spend appropriated funds. 204 The Legislature has
exercised judgment and discretion in the expenditure of funds in place
of the Governor.206 Consequently, the Legislature has eliminated the
Governor's discretion in spending the taxpayers' money and making
staffing decisions. 206
Line item xxxx-zzzz is comparable in its effect on the balance of
powers to the law the SJC invalidated in the 1976 Opinion of the Justices. 207
In that case, the court invalidated a measure that made the Legislature
the arbiter of hiring within the executive branch. 208 The Legislature
had not merely set aside a limited amount of money that the Governor
could use for hiring personnel, it had taken upon itself the responsi-
bility of choosing which particular vacancies in state positions could be
filled. 209 The court invalidated this regime, holding that the Legislature
must not be allowed to undertake the executive task of exercising
judgment and discretion in the expenditure of money."°With line item
xxxx-zzzz, the Legislature has again entrusted itself with making staffing
decisions for the executive branch. 2" The Legislature has precluded
the Governor from deciding what individual or group would best
provide educational and training services. 212
Line item xxxx-zzzz also resembles statutes that the high courts of
other states have invalidated as improper incursions on executive pre-
rogatives. 213 In Anderson v. Lamm, the Colorado Supreme Court invali-
dated the Legislature's attempt to specify the number of full-time
employees to be placed in each office of the Colorado Department of
Social Services."' The court concluded that the Legislature's action
was unconstitutional, because the Legislature may not interfere with
the executive's power to make staffing and resource allocation deci-
2°4 See Opinion of the Justices, 341 N.E.2d 254,257 (Mass. 1976).
2°5 See id.
2°6 See Opinion of the justices, 376 N.E.2d at 1222-23; Opinion of the Justices, 341 N.E.2d at 257.
207 See 341 N.E.2d at 255.
20 '8 See id. at 257.
2°5 See id. at 256-57.
mid, at 257.
211 See id.
212 See Opinion of the Justices, 341 N,E.2d at 257.
213 See Carruthers, 759 P.2d at 1387; Anderson, 579 P.2d at 626.
214 Anderson, 579 P.2d at 626.
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sions. 2 ' 5
 Line item xxxx-zzzz specifies what type of service providers
should be placed in the state prisons. That appropriation, like the one
invalidated in Anderson, interferes with the executive's power to make
staffing and resource allocation decisions. 210
In State v. Carruthers, the New Mexico Supreme Court considered
an appropriation that was practically identical to the one at issue in
line item xxxx-zzzz. 217
 The court invalidated the Legislature's attempt
to prevent the commodities support bureau from using private vendors
to warehouse and deliver commodities. 218
 Without even considering
the Legislature's intent on the issue, the court held that the relevant
purpose of the appropriation was to provide commodities to qualified
recipients. 219
 The court found it unacceptable for the Legislature to
attempt to hamper the Governor's control over those funds by prohib-
iting the privatization of the services funded by the appropriated mon-
eys.220
 The court reasoned that the Governor's veto merely removed a
condition that improperly limited the manner and means by which the
commodities could be delivered. 221
As a result, the SIC would likely conclude that preserving public
employment is not a valid legislative purpose. 222 In light of this finding,
the court would not have to consider whether the Governor has altered
that purpose; rather, the court could proceed to assess the other
potential goal of the appropriation. 223
B. Funding of Educational and Training Programs as a
Legislative Purpose
The Governor would argue that line item xxxx-zzzz's only valid
purpose is to fund educational and training programs in the state
prisons. He would argue, further, that he has not improperly altered
that purpose by deleting the language requiring that the services be
delivered by employees of DPS. Providing useful educational and train-
ing programs in the state prisons is a valid legislative goa1. 224 By appro-
priating five million dollars for such programs, the Legislature has
213 Id.
216 See id.
217 See Carruthers, 759 P.2d at 1387.
218 /d. at 1388.
213 See id. at 1387.
220 See id. at 1388.
221 Id.
222 See supra notes 200-21 and accompanying text.
223 See Attorney Gen., 427 N.E.2d at 738.
224 See Opinion of the Justices, 376 N.E.2d at 1220.
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made a statement concerning the value of rehabilitating prisoners. 225
It has exercised its power to order social priorities, "[a] nd focus the
energies of society into the accomplishment of designated objectives
or programs."225 The Legislature has chosen a worthy social objective
to pursue (rehabilitating prisoners) and made reference, in the line
item appropriating money for the task in DPS' budget, to the types of
programs that it believes will be effective (educational and training
programs) . 2"
The Governor has changed the amount of the appropriation and
the language of the budget line item, but he has not improperly altered
the purpose underlying line item xxxx-zzzz: funding educational and
training programs. 228 From an article 30 standpoint, the Legislature has
discharged its duty by choosing this goal and appropriating money for
its pursuit; the Legislature has made law. 229 The constitution charges
the Governor and his agents at DPS with executing that law. 23° The
constitution makes the Governor the "supreme executive magistrate,"
and dictates that he has exclusive authority to implement the policies
and goals for which the Legislature appropriates funds. 23 ' The Gover-
nor has decided not to place the responsibility for rehabilitating pris-
oners in the hands of the public employees at DPS. In doing so, he
has exercised discretion in applying the energies of the executive
branch to achieve the purposes of the laws. 232 The SJC has stated
explicitly that, qt] he executive branch is the organ of government
charged with responsibility [for] . . . having detailed and contempora-
neous knowledge regarding spending decisions." 2" The Governor has
determined that better services can be provided at lower cost by con-
tracting with a private sector firm.
In light of these findings by the Governor, enforcement of the
requirement that DPS employees provide the services in question would
result in a waste of the taxpayers' money. In this way, line item xxxx-zzzz
resembles the Legislature's attempt to require executive branch agen-
cies to spend all of the funds appropriated for given programs—an
effort invalidated in the 1978 Opinion of the Justices. 2m The court con-
225 see id.
226 See id.
227 See id.
228 See Attorney Gen., 427 N.E.2d at 738.
229 See Opinion of the Justices, 376 N.E.2d at 1220.
230 See id. at 1221.
231 See id. (citing MASS. CoNs -r. Part II, ch. 2, § 1, art 1).
232 See id. at 1223.
233 Id.
234 See Opinion of the Justices, 376 N.E.2d at 1224.
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eluded in that case, as it would here, that the Governor must have
discretion not to spend money in a wasteful fashion, provided that he
does not compromise the achievement of underlying legislative pur-
poses and goals.255 Assuming that the proper purpose of the appropria-
tion is to educate and train prisoners, the Governor has exercised his
discretion without altering the appropriation's purpose. 238
Further, this scenario stands in marked contrast to the cases in
which the SJC has invalidated gubernatorial action as beyond the scope
of the article 63 veto power. 237 The Governor has not, for example,
changed the DPS appropriation's purpose by altering a funding mecha-
nism.238 In a 1991 Opinion of the Justices, the Governor vetoed language
regarding the source of funding for various parks programs. 239 This
language contained a restriction that the money for those programs
be on hand at the outset. 24° The SJC invalidated the Governor's veto,
because it would have altered the legislative purpose of ensuring the
self-sufficiency of the parks through the creation of revolving funds. 241
The language was thus not separable and not subject to removal by
line-item veto. 242 There is no funding mechanism at issue in line item
xxxx-zzzz; whether or not the language in question is removed, four
million dollars will be drawn from the general fund for educational
and training programs in the state prisons.
The concerns that led the SJC to invalidate the Governor's veto
in a 1981 Opinion of the Justices are also not present in this scenario. 243
In that case, the Governor vetoed language requiring DSS to devote a
particular level of funding to day care and battered women services. 244
The court explained that the effect of the Governor's veto would be
to ignore the Legislature's decision that these social objectives should
be pursued through the appropriation for DSS. 243 In the line item
xxxx-zzzz scenario, however, the same social objectives will be pursued
whether or not the bracketed language appears in the final budget:
inmates of the state's prisons will receive educational and training
235 See id. at 1222-23.
256 See id.
257 See Opinion of the justices, 582 N.E.2d 509 (Mass. 1991); Opinion of the justices, 428
N.E.2d 117 (Mass. 1981).
2" See Opinion of the Justices, 582 N.E.2d at 510- 11.
239 1d.
240 see id.
2" 1d. at 511.
212 See id.
213 See Opinion of the Justices, 428 N.E.2d at 123.
244 Id. at 122-23.
245 1d. at 123.
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services.246 The quandary whose resolution rides on the validity of the
Governor's veto, is how that social objective will be pursued.
As a result, the SJC would likely conclude that funding educational
and training programs in the state prisons is a valid legislative pur-
pose. 247 Further, it would recognize that the Governor's veto has not
altered this purpose and thus hold that he properly deleted the brack-
eted language from line item xxxx-zzzz. 248
CONCLUSION
In November 1996, Governor Weld failed in his bid to unseat
Senator John F. Kerry in one of the nation's highest profile Senate
races. 249 In the same election, both Republican members of Congress
from Massachusetts lost re-election campaigns. 25° While no one factor
can account for these results, commentators agree that unions were
instrumental in delivering "Reagan Democrats," the important group
of right-leaning, working class workers, to the Democratic party. 251 As
a result, pressure is mounting on Republican party leaders to back away
from controversial efforts to privatize public service jobs. 252 Despite this
pressure and in the face of a furious outcry from union leaders and
community activists, the Weld Administration has continued to discuss
the possibility of privatizing the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Author-
ity's bus service. 253 If the Governor does continue to push privatization
proposals before a hostile Legislature, the SJC may soon be forced to
assess the constitutionality of the appropriation restriction. In that
event, the court would likely hold, in light of its jurisprudence on
articles 30 and 63 of the Massachusetts constitution, that the Governor
may veto language in an appropriation bill that conditions funding for
services on their being delivered by public employees.
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